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ABSTRACT
The relative costs of taking employment or receiving welfare are usually understood
through comparisons of a person’s social security entitlements and their wage alternative,
known as replacement rates. In some situations it appears that the additional income from
working is negligible, and this is said to constitute an “unemployment trap”. However,
conventional replacement rates ignore the fact that age-earnings profiles slope upward
through the acquisition of labour market experience. We offer a dynamic reinterpretation
and compare alternative calculations for Australia in 2000. The usual and incorrect
approach exaggerates significantly the likelihood of unemployment traps, but the
presence of children mitigates considerably, and can even reverse, this assessment.
Keywords: unemployment traps; social security; age-earnings profiles.
JEL Classification numbers: J00; J22; I3; I38.
1I Introduction and Motivation
Much research and policy analysis in labour economics pays little attention to social security
issues. Similarly, some major social security questions are often addressed without significant
recognition of labour market analyses. It is demonstrated in what follows that this lack of
synthesis can lead to imprecise — even incorrect — analyses of a fundamental area for
policy: the question of how work incentives are affected by the combined impact of the social
security benefit regime and income taxes.
Incentives to work have been of considerable interest to policy makers for many years. In a
tradition dating back to the nineteenth century, the question has often been addressed by
comparing the “cash in hand” position of the unemployed with the “cash in hand” position of
a typical wage earner. The basic idea is that to be encouraged to work a person would want to
earn more income than is available through not working. The sophisticated version of this
notion is that the incentive to work is described by the difference between paid work and
non-work income which, expressed as a proportion, is known as the “replacement rate” (RR).
More precisely, the replacement rate is usually defined to be the income that is received by a
person who relies solely on the social security system, as a proportion of the net (after tax and
benefits) income that would be received by that person if they worked for pay instead.
Relatively high RRs are understood to reflect an “unemployment trap”, the idea that the net
benefits when unemployed can sometimes be high enough to discourage the taking of jobs.
Commonly it is suggested that this can result in those affected remaining voluntarily on
benefits and thus being trapped in unemployment and poverty.
Arguably the presumed behavioural consequences for labour supply of high replacement
rates have had significant influences on policy. For example, the introduction of earned
income tax credits in the United States can, in part, be interpreted to be a response to the
presumed role of replacement rates in the context of welfare dependency. It seems clear that
the conceptual basis, interpretation and policy implications of replacement rates are
fundamental and broadly-based issues.
There are number of well known limitations with the use of replacement rates as a reflection
of paid work incentives. These include:
• The choice of “typical” net earnings can obscure more than it reveals. For example,
potential workers are unlikely to expect “typical” levels of earnings. People facing the
choice of whether to work or not are likely to be uncertain with respect to both benefit
entitlements and expected earnings, and these uncertainties are likely to influence
behaviour.1
• Replacement rate calculations are not instructive with respect to the actual response of
people to the incentives the RR is meant to encapsulate. As an OECD report on incentives
to work notes, these responses will be influenced by a whole range of factors beyond
                                                           
1 For a study of the incentive effects of benefit uncertainty, see Dustmann and Micklewright (1993). For the
effects of effects of earnings uncertainty see Hotz et al (1987).
2immediate financial return from paid work, including socially-generated peer pressures
and obligations imposed by benefit administrators on recipients.2
• Being “point in time”, the RR says nothing about the duration of benefits. This might
matter because social insurance regimes differ in legislated eligibility periods between
countries.
• Finally, as the 1995 OECD report noted in passing, “a low paid job might nevertheless be
the first step on the ladder towards higher earnings”.3
This paper is an exploration of the empirical and policy implications of this last point.
Surprisingly, it is an issue that we have not seen addressed in an empirically rigorous way,
and this makes it interesting. The essential idea is that the calculation of replacement rates at
a point in time misses the critical reality that earnings tend to rise with time in the labour
market, a finding most often interpreted to be a reflection of the role of labour market
experience on productivity and thus earnings.
That is, because time in employment influences positively future earnings it is critical to
incorporate this in an understanding of the effect of the social security system on employment
choice. Taking into account the fact that expected earnings are likely for most people to be
conditional on on-going employment it follows that the standard approach to calculating RRs
may be seriously misleading as an indication of disincentives to work. The marriage of basic
lessons from empirical labour economics with fundamental social security issues would seem
to be important.
In empirical terms we explore only basic issues. The most important is an illustration of the
circumstances, and the extent to which, expected future incomes might compromise
conventional unemployment trap conclusions. The analysis shows that the extent of the error
implicit in conventional RR analyses depends on a host of variables, such as an individual’s
formal education, likely occupation, and social security eligibility and generosity with respect
to the presence and age of children.
The paper pursues the basic theme by calculating some examples of net present value
analogues of replacement rates taking into account expected future incomes (now referred to
as the “dynamic” approach) which are then compared with the results of the standard method
which considers only current relative incomes (the “static” approach). These points are made
with reference to Australian earnings outcomes and social security arrangements that take
effect in June 2000. However, the Australian context is not important because the conceptual
and policy issues are relevant for all countries. It follows that our empirical analysis can and
should be applied to a host of other countries; there is nothing special about Australia in 2000
other than that the policy details and earnings data are both readily available and well known
to the authors.
                                                           
2 OECD (1995) pp. 35-44.
3 OECD (1995), p. 16.
3There are several limitations in what follows. The first is that our analysis does not address
issues related to preferences for paid work compared to “leisure”. That is, we make no
attempt to model optimum decision-making as is attempted, for example, in Blundell,
Duncan and Meghir (1992). We address only the modest challenge of asking how
replacement rate calculations are affected by giving weight to net income possibilities over
periods longer than the initial.
We also take no account of less than perfect information. There is a sizeable literature on the
effects on labour supply of uncertainty in a lifetime perspective,4 which is mostly in the
contexts of intertemporal smoothing of consumption and the retirement decision. Modelling
uncertainty (and the related role for risk) is clearly a useful direction in which to extend the
analysis. The point is touched on further below.
Finally, there is much more to be done. This is because the question addressed considers only
how static versus dynamic replacement rate estimates differ for the stark choice between
working full-time or not working and, moreover, are applied to only young adults in our
examples. However, there is a plethora of other important labour supply policy that should
take into account our basic point. Among others these include choices with respect to: the
timing of part-time paid work; remaining on social security for a period before taking up
employment; and the timing of retirement.
II The Conceptual and Theoretical Issue
II (i) Intuition
The idea motivating the paper can be understood with the use of Figure 1 which allows a
comparison between the static and dynamic replacement rate calculations. The data illustrate
the following hypothetical case with the use of current Australian data.5 The choice implicit
is for an individual aged 22 contemplating the decision of whether or not to take a full-time
job, or instead to be unemployed receiving a constant net income of around $8,000 per
annum.
This choice is assumed to be made with respect to the relative net present values of the
alternative income streams. It is assumed that the expected future stream of social security
and earnings are known with certainty, and that the decision to take employment results in
earnings by age as represented by the hypothetical profile.
The usual static replacement rate calculation ignores what might happen after the initial
period and is thus given by the ratio of A to B. In this example, the static replacement rate is
about 40 per cent.
                                                           
4 For example, Demers and Demers (1998), Blundell et al (1985), and Grossberg (1989).
5 The earnings profile is derived from Borland, Hirshberg and Lye (1997), and is for a relatively unskilled
male, after tax. The earnings relationships presented are typical for OECD countries.
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Illustrating the Static/Dynamic Replacement Rate Issue
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Calculating the dynamic replacement rate is more complicated. It requires a comparison of
the net present values of the expected net lifetime benefit stream suggested by the area ADEF
and the expected earnings profile suggested by the area BCEF.
Formally, the dynamic replacement rate is given by:
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where SSt is expected social security assistance received in year t, NEt is expected future
earnings in year t, r is the rate of time discount and T is the year of retirement.
In the simple example illustrated, the dynamic replacement rate is about 30 per cent (for a
discount rate of 5 per cent), which is much lower than that implied by the static calculation,6
although this will not always be the case. Ranges of the estimates are illustrated below.
II (ii) A formal theoretical basis
The dynamic replacement rate may be derived from a formal model of lifetime optimisation.
We consider an individual making employment choices in periods t=0,1 …T. At any time t
the individual is faced with a market employment offer yielding earnings NEt and the
alternative of a social security benefit yielding SSt. The value of the market offer is assumed
                                                           
6 It should be acknowledged that taking the non-work choice implies that an individual is able to continually
pass the activity test to maintain eligibility for benefits; if this is not the case, the dynamic replacement rate
calculations will be overstated to some extent.
5to depend on the individual’s stock of human capital Kt, which is determined by endowments
at time t=0, reflecting, among other things, native ability, education and employment history.
It is therefore given as a deterministic function NEt =NE(Kt). If acceptance of the market
offer is denoted by 1, and the non-market alternative is denoted by 0, the individual’s
employment history may be represented by a mapping E from {0,…T} to {0,1}.
We assume that human capital (productivity) increases with employment, with the extent of
the increase depending on the rate of accumulation of informal on-the-job training. The
extent to which this happens is conditional on the initial stock of human capital, meaning that
formal skills and employment are complements. Hence
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where:
Kt is the stock of human capital at time t; and
Et is the employment decision at time t; and
At time t, the individual must choose an employment path E:{t…T} to maximise
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This problem may be solved recursively. Hence we may write Vt+1*(Kt) for the optimal
solution at time t+1, given the level of human capital arising from the employment choice at
time t. Variations in Vt+1*(Kt) for different choices of Et, t=1…t reflect the impact of
employment choices on human capital stocks and earnings. We obtain the iterative solution:
V(Kt:Et = 0) = 
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If the impact of current employment decisions on future earnings is ignored, the term in
Vt+1*(Kt) is a constant which may be disregarded. In this case, individuals will choose
employment if and only if the static replacement rate,
SRRt = 
t
t
NE
SS
, (6)
is less than one (when any leisure benefits of the social security alternative are taken into
account). However, because individuals will care about future prospects the relevant variable
is the dynamic replacement rate, given by:
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6Suppose that human capital decreases with unemployment and increases with employment.
Then if reliance on social security benefits is chosen in period t and neither the social security
benefit nor the wage function f(K) changes, the wage offer in period t+1 will be lower than in
period t, while the value of the benefit will be unchanged. Hence, the social security option
will also be chosen in period t+1, and in all subsequent periods. Similarly, if employment is
chosen in period t, the wage offer will rise in period t+1 and employment will be chosen in
period t and all subsequent periods. Hence, the DRR becomes:
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A more general model would allow for stochastic shocks in the wage offer arising from
individual or firm-specific shocks as well as general labour market fluctuations. The
individual’s human capital stock K, determined by optimal employment choices, will also be
a stochastic process. Although this process will in general be complex, it may possess
absorbing states, such that, once the individual enters this state, they will remain in it. The
most important examples of absorbing states are lifetime employment and permanent
withdrawal from the labour force.
First, there may be an absorbing state in which the individual’s stock of human capital is so
high that the optimal choice is always to remain in employment, with a person enjoying a
rising income over time. Such an absorbing state may be referred to as a “career”. A career
has the property that the dynamic replacement ratio is always less than 1. Hence, even though
in some periods current earnings may be less attractive than the alternative of reliance on
social security, individuals are induced to remain in employment because of the benefits in
terms of future income.
On the other hand, there may exist some minimum level of human capital which is unaffected
by employment or unemployment. If the wage associated with this level of human capital is
always below the social security alternative, the individual will withdraw permanently from
employment.
A third possibility is that human capital does not increase with labour market experience, but
the wage varies stochastically, being sometimes greater than and sometimes less than the
income from social security. Since, in this case, human capital and future earnings are
unaffected by employment decisions, the individual will accept employment if and only if the
current wage exceeds the social security alternative. In other words, if and only if the static
replacement ratio (which equals the dynamic replacement ratio in this case) is less than 1.
In this terminology, the calculations of the dynamic replacement rate presented in this paper
are based on the assumption that the alternative to social security is lifetime employment.
Since the estimated earnings profiles are generally rising over time, this assumption seems
reasonable if we disregard the possibility of involuntary unemployment. More generally - but
with exceptions - however, the dynamic estimates of the replacement rate used here may be
regarded as a lower bound, to be compared with the upper bound represented by the usual
static replacement rate.
7Conceptually there seem to be two broad conclusions. The first is that because experience-
earnings profiles slope upwards, the static replacement rates will usually be greater than the
dynamic replacement rates for a significant proportion of the adult population. The important
implication for policy is that the incidence and extent of unemployment traps will be
exaggerated for many individuals if the static measures are used.
The second broad conceptual point is that for some groups the differences between the static
and dynamic measures will be large, and for others they will be small. This is the result of the
dynamic replacement rate calculations being sensitive to assumptions concerning: the
expected future earnings profile by both occupation and education; the role of inherent ability
as a determinant of the extent to which an individuals’ potential lifetime profile varies;
whether or not the choice is made as a single person or as a person in a household with
dependants; the chosen discount rate; and the expected future levels of social security
assistance.
The significance and contingencies associated with our alternative dynamic approach are now
explored empirically. We emphasise that while contemporary Australia is the example used,
the issue transcends specific institutional environments. The conceptual point is general.
III Illustrating the Empirical Issues
III(i) Background
There are two dimensions for calculations of differences between static and dynamic
replacement rates. The first concerns the numerator of equation 1, which depends on a
country’s social security benefit levels, and whether or not (and the extent to which) benefits
are contingent on the presence and age of children. The data are now shown for Australian
social security arrangements after July 2000.
III(ii) Hypothetical Lifetime Social Security Benefits
In most countries social security payments are both means-tested and contingent on family
circumstances, such as the presence, number and age of children. While the size of the
differences in static and dynamic replacement rates illustrated for contemporary Australian
circumstances are specific to this institutional context, it is very possible that the results
reflect broadly the situation for many other countries.
An important issue for the calculations is that the social security rules mean that net
household incomes vary with the age of children. However, static replacement rate
calculations do not take into account expected changes in social security payments as
children age, and thus these calculations get the numerator wrong. On the other hand — so
long as people anticipate the reality of social security benefits changing as their children age
— the numerator in the dynamic replacement rate calculation will be accurate.
Our illustrations of the replacement rate issues in the presence of children use the following
hypothetical and very simple example. It is assumed that those expecting to become parents
have two children, with the first and second being born when the parent is aged 23 and 25
respectively. Figure 2 shows the (after tax) lifetime social security payment streams for not-
employed individuals with and without children.
8Figure 2
2000 Australian Net Incomes of Not-Employed Individuals
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In many countries welfare benefits are available for those in low paid employment, meaning
that comparative replacement rate calculations for individuals faced with the choice of
working or not working have to take these into account. In the Australian case these take the
form of direct transfers, while in the United States earned income tax credits play this role.
The empirical exercises take into the Australian welfare arrangements for those in low paid
jobs.
The second essential aspect of dynamic replacement rate calculations concerns the
denominator of equation 1, expected lifetime earnings. This is now considered.
III(iii) Hypothetical Lifetime Earnings Profiles
There are a very large number of lifetime earnings profiles that could be used to illustrate the
relative size of static and dynamic replacement rate calculations for Australia in 2000. To
make things simple the focus is on just a few, chosen to reflect what are likely to be feasible
ranges in the data. It is worth noting that the age-earnings profiles used are very similar to
those found in most OECD countries, meaning that the essence of the Australian calculations
would very likely be replicated for many other countries.7
                                                           
7 An obvious area for research would be the replication of our estimates in other countries. The differences
between the static and dynamic replacement rate calculations, and what they mean for the existence or
otherwise of unemployment traps, must vary between countries, in part as a consequence of international
variations in the structure of earnings.
9Six scenarios are used, derived from a variety of earnings profile sources for full-time
workers, and all are adjusted to reflect 2000 real wages.8 The age-earnings profiles are
presented in Appendix Figures 1–6.9
The first two reflect very different occupations, and are as follows:
(i) Male lawyers.10 For this group earnings over the life cycle are high, and increase quite
quickly as male lawyers acquire more experience; and
(ii) Nurses, receiving legislated pay.11 This is a relatively low paid group, and the assumed
age profile is relatively flat.
The final four earnings scenarios12 are for both men and women with very different levels of
education. They are:
(iii) Average male university graduates;
(iv) Average female university graduates;
(v) Average males with no formal education beyond high school; and
(vi) Average females with no formal education beyond high school.
These age-earnings profile scenarios have been chosen because they reflect a very broad yet
credible range of expected lifetime earnings. Importantly, they differ with respect to the rate
at which earnings increase with labour market experience, which will be the most critical
influence for static and dynamic replacement rate comparisons. In combination with social
security benefits the data from these profiles are now used in various calculations and
comparisons of static and dynamic replacement rates.
IV Static and Dynamic Replacement Rate Comparisons
IV (i) Background
The exercises now addressed consider the question implied in the usual (static) replacement
rate policy analysis: what are the financial incentives to take a job given the comparative
income consequences of staying on social security benefit arrangements? Our contribution is
to compare these calculations with estimates of replacement rates which take account of
prospective earnings (and social security benefits) beyond the initial period.
                                                           
8 In all the Appendix figures “gross” refers to before-tax earnings, with “net” reflecting adjustment for taxes
assuming no dependants.
9 The profiles are smooth because they are predicted from the coefficients of the relevant earnings functions.
10 From Blandy and Baker (1992), derived from the 1991 Australian Census.
11 The profile is for nurses employed in New South Wales (Australia’s most populated state). Earnings rise
initially because the legal (industrial award) conditions specify wage increases for each of the first eight
years of experience, with no increments after that. It is assumed that the hypothetical nurse in the example
receives the lowest level of legislated wages.
12 Derived from Borland et al (1997). The non-graduates profiles have been given slightly flatter experience-
earnings profiles, which is a usual earnings function result.
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The illustrations of the static/dynamic replacement rate point are very specific, the
expectation being that our results will encourage broader analyses of the basic issues. The
following hypothetical scenario is used: a 22 year old jobless person is assumed to face only
the choice of remaining jobless, or taking full-time work until retirement.13  If the static
replacement rate is the basis of this decision, the person compares point-in-time welfare
benefits with alternative current earnings.
However, if expected future incomes are taken into account, the dynamic replacement rate is
what matters. For these calculations it is assumed that: the person believes they can contrive
to be eligible for income support throughout their life; real levels of social security are
assumed not to vary from the 2000 arrangements illustrated above; the person expects to earn
with certainty the average net incomes of their sex by age (for the different scenarios
explained above); and, a discount rate of 5 per cent per annum applies.14
As is the case with most countries the 2000 Australian social security benefit levels differ
significantly according to the age of children. This turns out to be a critical dimension of the
static/dynamic replacement rate comparisons, and motivates the case for separate analyses of
the issue for households with and without children. We start with the former case.
IV (ii) Replacement Rate Comparisons for Households with no Dependants
Table 1 shows the static and dynamic replacement rate calculations for an adult with no
dependants, and with respect to each of the six earnings profiles described above and
presented in the Appendix Figures.
                                                           
13 While this seems to be a limited way of looking at the unemployment trap, it is essentially what is implied in
static replacement rate calculations. Thus the comparison with our alternative dynamic replacement rates is
pertinent.
14 We explored the role of the discount rate by calculations involving a 10 per cent rate. The broad results are
insensitive to the discount rate choice, at least in this range.
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Table 1
Static and Dynamic Replacement Rates (per cent) for Different Scenarios:
Single Adult Households with No Children
Assumed Income Static
(i)
Dynamic   (ii) Ratio
(i)/(ii)
Male lawyer 37 22 1.70
Nurse 42 34 1.23
University Qualified Male 53 37 1.43
University Qualified Female 63 42 1.50
High School Completed Male 70 51 1.38
High School Completed Female 71 59 1.20
The important points with respect to single adult households without children are as follows:
(i) The static rates are much higher than the dynamic rates in every case, on average by
around 40 per cent;
(ii) There are important differences in the extent to which the static and dynamic calculations
diverge within assumed earnings streams, from about 70 per cent for male lawyers to 20 per
cent for an average unskilled female;
(iii) The higher are expected lifetime earnings, the less close are the static and dynamic rate
estimates, a result driven by the high earnings groups having relatively steep profiles; and
(iv) Even when expected lifetime income is quite low for a full-time worker — such as with
unskilled females — the difference between the static and dynamic rates still seems to be
significant.
The bottom line for the groups considered is that the usual (static) replacement rate
calculations overstate the extent to which welfare “traps” people in unemployment. The role
of social security as a potentially adverse influence on a jobless person’s employment and
earnings prospects is more benign than usually conjectured, for these examples of single
people without children.
However, social security benefit levels usually depend on the presence and age of children.
Thus it is of interest to explore the extent to which static and dynamic replacement
comparison rates are affected with children. These are now illustrated for sole parent
households.
IV (iii) Replacement Rate Calculations for Sole Parent Households
Dynamic replacement rates are preferable to static calculations for many reasons, one being
that they take into account the role of future expected welfare benefits which depend on the
presence and age of children. What now follows illustrates the extent to which this matters by
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replicating the scenarios of Table 1 changing only one factor: expecting the presence of
children. This means that the calculations are for sole parents only.
While this is clearly an unrepresentative hypothetical case, it has the following strength.
Welfare support in most countries — including Australia in 2000 — varies according to both
household income and the number of dependants. Thus considering households expecting to
have children opens up a plethora of possible complicated replacement rate comparisons.
Calculations for households with two parents have considerable analytical interest and policy
relevance, but they are beyond the scope of the paper.
It is worth emphasising that our goal is to establish the basis of a different replacement rate
research agenda, rather than to draw out the implications of myriad family and social security
policy arrangements. Even accepting this modest research context, it is clear that the presence
of children is a critical factor in an understanding of comparisons of static and dynamic
replacement rates, and justifies the illustrations following.
The assumptions underlying the replacement rate calculations are the same as those used for
single people expecting to remain childless explained above, with the following difference.
This is that the hypothetical 22 year old now expects to have children. Specifically, they
assume that the first child will be born when the parent is 23, and that a second child is
expected to arrive at age 25. Expectations of future income are the same as those described
for those expecting no children.
Table 2 shows the static and dynamic replacement rate calculations for different scenarios for
a 22 year old person expecting two children at the ages described above.
Comparisons of the results with those of Table 1 reveal important changes when children are
expected. The first point is that, in general, the difference between the static and dynamic
calculations are reduced considerably given the expectation of children - the (unweighted)
overall decrease is of the order of 30 percentage points to an average of around 10 per cent.
Table 2
Static and Dynamic Replacement Rates (per cent) for Different Scenarios:
A Single Adult Household Expecting Two Children
Assumed Income Static
(i)
Dynamic
(ii)
Ratio
(i)/(iii)
Male lawyer 37 31 1.17
Award nurse 42 47 0.90
University qualified male 53 48 1.10
University qualified female 63 52 1.21
High School completed male 70 58 1.21
High School completed female 71 63 1.12
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The second point is that the dynamic replacement rates remain higher than the static rates for
most groups even given the expectation of children. For example, for unqualified men and
women expecting children the dimensions of the unemployment trap are still exaggerated if
only the static rates are used, but the extent of the difference is reduced by 17 and 8
percentage points respectively.
Finally, for one of the groups considered — Award wage nurses – if there is an expectation
of children — the dynamic replacement rate calculations are actually less than the static. That
is, taking into account both the expectation of children and future wages, the unemployment
trap for this group is greater than might usually have been presumed. The extent of this
difference is around 10 percentage points, which is more than trivial.
The switch in the relative size of the dynamic and static RRs for nurses is a consequence of
the juxtaposition of two things: the relatively flat wage profile and the fact that welfare
payments increase over time with children. While the expectations of children will generally
reduce the dynamic RRs, they can even become less than the static RRs if the wage profile is
sufficiently flat.
There are several critical points for welfare analysis and policy raised by these results. One is
that for most skill groups the expectation of the presence of children reduces the extent of,
but does not eliminate, the error associated with the use of static replacement rate
calculations. Second, while the use of the usual static replacement rate calculations as an
indication of potential unemployment traps is always a mistake, for most low skill groups
with children the implications are benign. Finally, there are some groups expecting to have
children for which the presumed unemployment trap is actually higher than would be
presumed using the conventional and incorrect approach. This might imply a strong case for
revisiting policy issues related to the behavioural consequences of effective marginal tax
rates in certain circumstances.
V An Agenda for Future Research
V(i) Background
The analysis and empirical illustrations should be seen to be the beginnings of a potentially
broadly-based research program. There is much to be done with respect to theory, and there is
a multitude of possible applications
V(ii) Theory
In the analysis above it has been assumed that future earnings and benefit payments are
known with certainty. The extension of the modelling to a stochastic optimisation problem is
beyond the scope of  this paper. Nevertheless, a few observations may be made about the way
in which the analysis would be affected if uncertainty were modelled explicitly.
The most obvious is that, since the analysis is expressed in terms of replacement rates, rather
than absolute returns to employment and non-employment, there is an implicit assumption of
homotheticity in preferences, and therefore of constant relative risk-aversion. Thus the
assumption of a fixed relationship between benefits and expected earnings means that
14
uncertainty about movements in average earnings has no effect on the dynamic replacement
rate calculations.
Two relevant sources of uncertainty are: possible differences in the individual’s earnings and
to the average cross-sectional data of the group considered; and uncertainty about benefit
levels. With respect to an individual’s expectations of earnings there are at least two possible
sources of uncertainty, arising from: (i) the possibility that the future longitudinal earnings
stream of the group will differ from the current cross-section, which can only reflect the past;
and (ii) the fact that individuals have distinct inherent capacities, which will manifest itself in
a person’s earnings potentially being quite different to the average. The fact that earnings
functions estimations typically explain less than a third of measured variation is testimony to
the importance of individual effects, among other things.
In terms of the stream of expected social security benefits there are also several possible
sources of uncertainty. Among others these arise from: (i) the possibility of changes in the
policy rules; and (ii) the effects of changes in the purchasing power of benefits, which will
depend particularly on the vagaries of inflation in systems without indexation. Even when
benefits are indexed there will still be real effects from inflation because the indexing rules
can never completely accurately ensure purchasing power protection for all people given
differences in consumption patterns.
Other things being equal, the greater the uncertainty associated with either the employment or
the non-employment option, the less attractive that option will be. Since the two effects will
work in opposite directions, it is not possible to determine the net effect a priori. However, it
seems likely that uncertainty about individual earnings will be greater than uncertainty about
benefit rules.
It thus seems likely that high levels of risk aversion, as with high discount rates, will reduce
the dynamic replacement rate relative to the static rate. As with most situations involving a
trade between  deterministic present benefits and uncertain future benefits, the effects of risk
aversion and discounting reinforce each other. Formally modelling the factors associated with
uncertainty is an obvious next step.
V(ii) Empirical Analysis
The calculations offered above barely scratch the surface of static and dynamic replacement
rate comparisons. Several obvious areas of extension are as follows.
First, our illustrations concern only the choice of lifetime employment compared to non-
employment, and only for people making this choice at age 22. An obvious extension would
be static and dynamic replacement rate calculations for people at different stages of the life-
cycle, and with respect to many more complicated labour supply choices.
As well, interesting and policy relevant replacement rate calculations could be considered for
the following labour supply choices, among many: (i) non-employment versus part-time
employment, for different regimes of abatement rates of benefits with earnings; (ii) the
timing of the resumption of employment, given periods spent in full-time child-rearing; (iii)
the retirement decision, which will be affected more by superannuation arrangements and
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taxation than welfare; and (iv) the question of the costs and benefits of undertaking formal
education for older people.
Second, our illustrations have used Australian 2000 social security arrangements. While
many of the broad results will be similar for other country’s systems and earnings profiles, it
is of interest to know how great the variations are. In particular, countries with relatively
generous means-testing rules or large welfare adjustments with children will have quite
different relative replacement rates. The implications of these differences in terms of
unemployment traps are likely to be very significant for policy.
Third, the structure of earnings is fundamental to calculations of dynamic replacement rates,
and these differ significantly within and between countries, across time, and with respect to
technological progress. For example, countries undergoing rapid industrial transformation,
such as Japan in the 1960 to 1990 period, tend to have high on-the-job training and thus steep
earnings profiles.15 On the other hand, technological stagnation, high minimum wages and
perhaps union presence all tend to be associated with relatively flat profiles. These possible
effects on earnings profiles will have consequences for dynamic replacement rate calculations
and thus for our understanding of unemployment traps.
VI Conclusion
It has been demonstrated that conventional analyses of the influence of welfare support on
employment choices are conceptually wrong. So long as individuals care about the future,
comparisons between point-in-time welfare benefits and earnings are incorrect
representations of the true replacement rate, for two reasons.
The most important of these is that earnings-experience profiles slope upwards. This means
that for most people there will be significant earning benefits in taking employment even
when starting earnings are low relative to social security. The second issue relates to the fact
that welfare benefits usually change for families with the presence and ageing of children.
Thus both the numerator (welfare payments) and denominator (current alternative wages) of
the usual (static) replacement rate calculations are in error. We suggest an alternative,
dynamic, replacement rate calculation.
Several simple illustrations of the relative size of the static and dynamic rates show that the
differences can be very large. Moreover, they differ significantly according to a person’s
formal levels of education (because this affects the expected slope of the earnings profile)
and the presence and age of children (because these are associated with welfare benefit
variations). But we have only begun to scratch the surface of the myriad implications.
There is a significant number of possible theoretical extensions of the basic point. As well,
there are a very large number of possible empirical applications, reflecting the roles of
different welfare arrangements as well as wage structures that vary across time and space.
The basic point of the paper is worth emphasising: expectations of the nature of net future
incomes make “point in time” calculations of financial returns from work a partial, and thus
                                                           
15 See Tan (1980).
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incorrect, indicator of the labour supply implications of the social security system. It is
critical to recognise that the circumstances under which the conventional measures are
misleading are quite complicated, which means that unconditional statements on the issue are
bound to be wrong. Unemployment traps are not what they seem.
Bibliography
Blandy, Richard and Baker, M. (1992), “Lawyers’ incomes”, paper presented to the 18th
Conference of Economists, Melbourne.
Borland, Jeff, Hirshberg, J and Lye, J. (1997), “Computer knowledge and earnings: evidence
for Australia”, University of Melbourne, Department of Economics Research Paper No.
571.
Blundell, R. Duncan, A. and Meghir, C. (1992), “Taxation in empirical labour supply
models: lone mothers in the UK”, Economic Journal, 102(411), March.
Blundell, R. Fry, V. and Meghir, C. (1985), “Lambda-constant and alternative empirical
models of life-cycle behaviour under uncertainty”, University College London Discussion
Paper 85–26.
Demers, F. and Demers, M. (1988), “The optimal choice of labour supply under uncertainty:
a non-expected utility analysis”, University of British Columbia, Department of
Economics Discussion Paper 88–25.
Dustmann, C. and Micklewright, J. (1993), “Benefits, Incentives and uncertainty” in Barr, N.
and Whynes, D., Current issues in the Economics of Welfare, New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1993, pages 87-104.
Grossberg, J. (1989), “Labour supply under real wage uncertainty: a new look at the
intertemporal substitution hypothesis”, Southern Economic Journal, 55(4) April.
Harding, A. and Polette, J. (1995), “The price of means tested transfers: effective marginal
tax rates in Australia in 1994”, Australian Economic Review, 95(3).
Hotz, J., Kydland, F. and Sedlacek, G. (1987), “Intertemporal preferences and labour
supply”, Economics Research Centre/NORC Discussion Paper, Chicago.
Ingles, D. (1997), “Low income traps for working families” Centre for Economic Policy
Research Discussion Paper No. 363, Canberra.
OECD (1995), “Making work pay: taxation, benefits and unemployment”, OECD Jobs
Strategy Monograph, Paris.
Owen, J. (1989), “Labour supply over the life cycle: the long term forecasting problem”,
International Journal of Forecasting, 5(2).
Tan, Hong W. (1980) “Specific training and technological change: a case study of Japan”,
PhD thesis, Yale University.
17
Whiteford, P. (1995), “The use of replacement rates in international comparisons of benefit
systems”, International Social Security Review, 48(2).
18
Appendix 1
A Basic Description of July 2000 Australian Social Security Arrangements
In Australia in 2000 the important social security rules are as follows:
(i) Unemployment insurance, as understood in the US and other countries, doesn’t exist.
Instead social security payments are made without reference to past earnings or employment;
(ii) An unemployed adult with no dependants is eligible for a means-tested payment, known
as unemployment benefit. This payment is about $A190 per week (currently worth around
$US120);
(iii) If the household of an unemployed adult has children it is eligible for additional
payments which are means-tested on the basis of household income. This means, for
example, that a two adult household with an unemployed husband and children will receive
lower payments the higher is the income of the wife;
(iv) Low earnings households receive social security payments and tax benefits which vary
with both earnings and the presence of children;
(v) There is a non means-tested tax rebate for sole parents; and
(vi) All benefits for households with children vary according to their age: assistance increases
when children are aged between 13 and 15 years, but cut out when a child reaches the age of
16.
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Appendix 2
Coefficients Used For Average Full-time Earnings Profiles
Wage equation coefficients Females Males
Constant 5.416 5.4847
Labour market experience 0.0353 0.0438
Labour market experience squared -0.0007 -0.0007
Completed High School 0.1126 0.0845
Trade Qualification 0.1169 0.0763
Certificate/Diploma 0.29 0.1583
Degree 0.4131 0.3686
Married 0.036 0.0891
Source: Borland et al (1997).
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Appendix Figure 1
Male Lawyer Gross and Net Lifetime Earnings Profiles
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Appendix Figure 2
Gross and Net Award Wage Nurse Lifetime Earnings Profiles
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Appendix Figure 3
Gross and Net Lifetime Earnings Profiles for Males with Degrees
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Appendix Figure 4
Gross and Net Lifetime Earnings Profiles for Females with Degrees
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Appendix Figure 5
Lifetime Earnings Profiles for Males without Degrees
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Appendix Figure 6
Lifetime Earnings Profiles for Females without Degrees
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